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I. Introduction
Among the many legal strategies for controlling corporate
wrongdoing, gatekeeper liability is perhaps the most complex and
difficult to justify. As conventionally understood, this strategy
involves imposing liability on “gatekeepers”—actors such as
lawyers, investment bankers, and accountants—for the wrongs of
their corporate clients, thus giving gatekeepers incentives to use
their power to monitor and to control, or at least to influence, the
conduct of their corporate clients and thereby to deter
wrongdoing by them.1 In business transactions, client wrongdoing
* Associate Professor, Washington University School of Law. For helpful
comments and discussions, I thank Linda Liang and Tun-Jen Chiang. For
excellent research assistance, I thank Tyler Nullmeyer.
1. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs
of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 890 (1984) [hereinafter Kraakman,
Corporate Liability Strategies] (“The first requisite for gatekeeper liability is, of
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often takes the form of disclosure misstatements to investors.
Gatekeeper liability is premised, first, on the ability of
gatekeepers to influence their clients’ conduct.2 Second, it is
premised on the incapacity of more direct forms of liability—
namely, individual and enterprise liability—to effectively deter
wrongdoing by corporate entities.3 Third, it is premised on the
inability of gatekeepers’ reputations and of other market
mechanisms to appropriately shape gatekeepers’ conduct in the
absence of liability.4 Fourth, and somewhat paradoxically, it is
also premised on the adequacy of gatekeepers’ reputations—on
the idea that gatekeepers can “stake” their reputations on the
accuracy and completeness of their clients’ assertions to
investors.5
Other factors also complicate the design of conventional
gatekeeper liability regimes. Gatekeepers often respond to new
regimes with countermoves, seeking to comply with the law
without honoring its spirit, which makes the task of delineating
gatekeepers’ duties difficult.6 Gatekeepers’ incentives routinely
course, an outsider who can influence controlling managers to forgo offenses.”);
Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORGAN. 53, 62–66 (1986) [hereinafter Kraakman,
Gatekeepers] (discussing the monitoring function of gatekeepers).
2. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 1, at 890.
3. See id. at 868 (“[Gatekeeper liability] serves to remedy enforcement
insufficiencies . . . .”); id. at 888 (“Enforcement insufficiency occurs when both
enterprise and individual penalties fail to elicit sufficient compliance at an
acceptable cost.”); Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting
Lawyers To Improve The Regulation of Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
1019, 1048 (1993) (describing gatekeeper liability in the field of financial
regulation as “at most, a supplement to the dominant form of regulation in the
field: direct controls over financial intermediaries”).
4. See Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 1, at 94 (“[G]atekeeper liability
is valuable only if both of these private alternatives [reputation and contractual
arrangements] prove inadequate . . . .”).
5. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 620 (1984) (“[T]he investment banker
rents the issuer its reputation. The investment banker represents to the
market . . . that it has evaluated the issuer’s product and good faith and that it
is prepared to stake its reputation on the value of the innovation.”); see also
JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 3 (2006) (“Central to this model [of gatekeepers] is the concept of
reputational capital and the subsidiary idea that it can be pledged or placed at
risk by the gatekeeper’s vouching for its client’s assertions or projections.”).
6. See Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 12, at 893–96
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diverge from those of their employees and others who act on their
behalf, a misalignment that gatekeepers’ clients may use to
undermine the deterrent force of gatekeeper liability.
Gatekeepers often have long-standing relationships with their
clients and are beholden to them for fees, creating powerful forces
that may counter the intended effects of gatekeeper liability.
There is also the so-called multiple gatekeeper phenomenon in
business transactions—in which multiple distinct gatekeepers
serve clients, acting interdependently, rather than independently
of one another, and forming “an interlocking and interacting web
of protection” against corporate wrongdoing.7 Nevertheless,
despite this complexity and these challenges, gatekeeper liability
has become a popular strategy for controlling corporate
wrongdoing, especially in business transactions.8
The gatekeeper liability strategy has also attracted close
scholarly attention. In Collaborative Gatekeepers,9 an important,
recent contribution to this literature, Professor Stavros Gadinis
and Mr. Colby Mangels draw on techniques that have been
successful in anti-money laundering (AML) regulation to propose
a regulatory strategy to induce gatekeepers to effectively deter
client wrongs.10 Their strategy is designed to avoid many of the
challenges facing conventional gatekeeper liability regimes.11 It is
ambitious, original, and provocative. In this response, I assess the
proposal’s likely effectiveness by first distinguishing it from
conventional gatekeeping regimes and then assessing the extent
to which it overcomes the common shortcomings of such regimes.
I argue in favor of the proposal but suggest that its success is
likely to depend on the particular ways in which it interacts with
these (conventional) gatekeeping regimes—because the proposal
is intended to be overlaid on these regimes, rather than to amend
or replace them. I also explain how the proposal will, inevitably,
(discussing difficulties with the design of gatekeepers’ duties).
7. Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeepers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583, 1602
(2010).
8. For an overview of contexts in which gatekeeper liability is used, see
Coffee, supra note 5, at 103–07.
9. Stavros Gadinis & Colby Mangels, Collaborative Gatekeepers, 73 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 797 (2016).
10. See id. at 893–910.
11. See infra notes 18–34 (discussing these challenges).
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prove difficult to justify—not because it lacks justification, but
because gatekeeper liability, by its nature, hinges on the
satisfaction of numerous complex conditions that cannot be
established—easily, or at all—at least to the satisfaction of those
inclined to oppose new liability regimes. Nevertheless, Gadinis
and Mangels’s proposal is so cautiously and richly developed, and
its own potential shortcomings so frankly acknowledged and
assessed, that it warrants close investigation in the settings in
which it could be applied.
II. The Proposal: Collaborative Gatekeepers
Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels propose a regime
inspired by requirements in AML regulation for banks to lodge
suspicious activity reports with banking authorities.12 Under the
proposed regime, which they would overlay on existing
regulation,13 gatekeepers would be required to collaborate with
regulators by reporting (to regulators) any conduct on the part of
their clients that they suspect involves wrongdoing.14
Gatekeepers would report anonymously, a feature designed to
shield them from client retribution,15 and they would face civil
liability for failing to report as required. If gatekeepers
discharged this reporting duty, they would enjoy immunity from
subsequent actions, both public and private, related to the
content of their reports “provided they continue[d] to act in good
faith.”16 Although gatekeepers might well intervene in a
prospective business transaction in order to deter wrongdoing by
their clients, such as by actively disrupting wrongdoing or by
“closing the gate” on the transaction, what the duty requires is
12. See Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 9, at 869–74.
13. Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels note that “the[ir] collaborative
gatekeeping model simply adds a reporting obligation,” without suggesting that
any existing laws be amended or replaced. Id. at 913.
14. See id. at 838 (“The central part of this Article’s proposal is a new
obligation for gatekeepers: to file a report alerting regulators to suspicious
activities by their clients.”).
15. See id. at 836 (noting that “[a]nonymity shields gatekeepers from
clients’ objections”).
16. Id. at 910; see also id. at 836 (“In return for submitting their suspicions,
gatekeepers gain immunity with regard to client misconduct.”).
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simply for gatekeepers to report their suspicions about their
clients’ activity to regulators, rather than to take other corrective
or preventive action. The proposed technique is thus not
gatekeeping as conventionally understood, but a novel, targeted
technique intended to ensure a particular form of gatekeeper
involvement in business transactions.17
The proposed regime is also intended to sidestep many of the
core challenges facing commonly existing gatekeeper liability
regimes, which Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels describe as
“conventional” regimes.18 First, gatekeeper liability regimes
typically impose knowledge-based or fault-based duties on
gatekeepers—standards that may invite strategic conduct by
gatekeepers designed more to avoid liability than to halt client
wrongdoing. They explain that scienter-based duties give
gatekeepers incentives to “avert[] their gaze, so that they limit
the chances of coming across information that would compromise
their unawareness.”19 Fault-based gatekeeper duties are similarly
problematic: although often “less demanding” than scienter-based
duties, they “still require[] gatekeepers to turn away their clients
only after evidence starts mounting against them.”20 Under either
approach, therefore, gatekeepers “often find themselves tiptoeing
around the red line of illegality, putting up a shield around their
own liability, rather than worrying about the impact of their
client’s actions for third parties and the financial system as a
whole.”21 In consequence, Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels
explain, “information that does not render gatekeepers
knowledgeable or negligent, but could still offer helpful tips in
investigations, never reaches enforcement authorities.”22
17. The proposal might even be considered a hybrid between gatekeeping
and whistleblowing. It imposes potential liability on gatekeepers in a manner
that effectively ensures a form of gatekeeper monitoring, while also requiring
the disclosure of suspected wrongdoing to enforcement officials.
18. See id. at 806, 814, 847, 913 (referring to “conventional” gatekeeper
liability regimes).
19. Id. at 821.
20. Id. at 823.
21. Id.; see also id. at 834–35 (“Not surprisingly, gatekeepers have directed
their energy in clearly demarcating their knowledge or negligence, as the case
may be, so that they can avoid liability.”).
22. Id. at 835. Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels further note that
“gatekeepers have an incentive to suppress this information, for fear that, if
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To escape this concern, the proposal “effectively expand[s]
the scope of [gatekeepers’] obligations beyond the safe haven of
awareness to the unchartered territory of suspicions and
doubts.”23 It does so by adding their new reporting regime to the
existing framework.24 Under the new regime, gatekeepers must
report when they “come across some indications that raise
suspicions [about their clients’ conduct] that fall far short of
confirming problems.”25 The duty would be harder to “game” than
knowledge-based or fault-based duties, making gatekeepers more
likely to comply with it than those conventionally articulated
duties and potentially giving regulators more information and
thus more effectively deterring wrongdoing than existing
gatekeeper regimes operating alone.
The second challenge concerns gatekeepers’ bonds with their
clients. As a transaction progresses, these bonds can strengthen,
diminishing the likelihood that the gatekeeper will interdict
wrongdoing by its client and even increasing the risk that the
gatekeeper will actively assist its client in wrongdoing. By
effectively lowering the triggering event or threshold to
“suspicion”—or, more accurately, by adding such a duty to the
conventional regimes—the proposed regime makes it more likely
that gatekeepers will not only be required to act, but be required
to act sooner—“at a very early stage in the development of [the
gatekeeper-client relationship],” before strong client bonds have
been able to develop.26 The presumption is that gatekeepers are
more likely to act against their clients early in relationships than
after they have invested in these relationships and grown loyal to
their clients.27
Third, the interests of individuals acting on behalf of
gatekeepers may diverge from those of the gatekeepers. In
consequence, individual agents of a gatekeeper may find it
found out, it might be considered incriminatory in hindsight.” Id.
23. See id. at 854 (describing the anti-money laundering laws on which the
proposed regime is based, and therefore referring specifically to the obligations
of “banks” rather than to those of “gatekeepers”).
24. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the reporting
feature of Gadinis and Mangels’s proposal).
25. Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 9, at 836.
26. Id. at 844.
27. Id.
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cost-beneficial to acquiesce in client wrongdoing while the
gatekeeper’s incentives are to oppose it.28 For example, a law firm
partner may choose to overlook a key client’s wrongdoing to avoid
losing that client’s business, even though in doing so he or she
may be exposing the law firm to significant harm. Responding to
this challenge, Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels suggest
imposing liability for violations of the reporting duty on
individual agents as well as on gatekeepers.29 They also suggest
that gatekeepers might, in response to the proposed reporting
duty, engage compliance officers to report suspicions, effectively
“delinking” the reporting duty from the individuals most likely to
have personal ties to clients and thus most likely to acquiesce in
client wrongdoing.30
The proposed regime also addresses the so-called multiple
gatekeeper phenomenon that afflicts gatekeeper liability regimes.
As I have argued elsewhere, the unitary gatekeeper rarely exists
in corporate and securities transactions, even though the
literature has generally modeled the liability of either a single
gatekeeper or each of several gatekeepers independently of one
another.31 Rather, gatekeepers are more accurately envisioned as
acting interdependently and thus as forming an interlocking and
interacting web of protection against corporate wrongdoing.32
Effectively deterring client wrongdoing in a transaction may
require multiple gatekeepers—each with distinct spheres of
influence and expertise—to take precautions and to cooperate in
doing so.33 By having gatekeepers all report to a single regulator,
the Gadinis-Mangels proposal enables a single entity—the
relevant regulator—to piece together fragmented information
that no single gatekeeper possesses, to draw upon additional
expertise as needed, and thereby to overcome the possibility of
gatekeepers not cooperating when effective deterrence requires
that they do so. Accordingly, gatekeepers that have “only partial
28. Id. at 815–17.
29. See id. at 840 (”[I]ndividual employees may be subject to monetary
penalties or other disciplining sanctions.”).
30. Id. at 845.
31. See Tuch, supra note 7, at 1589–91.
32. See id at 1591–1604.
33. For a more detailed discussion on the issue of multiple gatekeepers, see
id. at 1601–04, 1622–23.
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information” will report it to regulators, allowing regulators to
“utilize their investigatory powers to extract valuable evidence”
and possibly fill in the remaining pieces.34
III. Assessment of the Proposal
A. The Challenges of Conventional Gatekeeper Liability
The proposal astutely responds to many of the limitations of
gatekeeper liability regimes. By lowering the threshold at which
gatekeepers must act, it requires vigilance by gatekeepers early
in the transactional process, diminishing the chance that strong
client bonds will lead gatekeepers and their representatives to
acquiesce in client wrongdoing. By formulating that threshold in
terms that gatekeepers are less likely to strategically defeat, such
as by adopting a “head-in-the-sand” approach, the strategy
promises greater gatekeeper vigilance than otherwise. And by
feeding this information to a single party (a designated regulator)
that has the potential to draw on additional expertise, as needed,
the proposal attempts to correct for the fragmented nature of the
gatekeeping net.
To be sure, as Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels
acknowledge, the proposed strategy cannot address all of the
challenges facing conventional gatekeeper liability regimes, and
it has potential shortcomings of its own. Under the proposed
regime, gatekeepers might seek to comply with the reporting
obligation in order to gain immunity but without providing useful
information to regulators.35 Gatekeepers might have strong ties
with clients that pre-exist the transaction in question,
diminishing the promise of early reporting. Gatekeepers might
find themselves torn between reporting on their clients and
discharging duties, such as fiduciary duties, toward their
clients36—potentially compromising the quality of their advice,
34. Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 9, at 838.
35. See id. at 843 (“Strategically minded gatekeepers might wish to provide
regulators with just enough facts so as to secure the immunity benefits, while
also discouraging the regulator from actually conducting further
investigations.”).
36. See id. at 844 (exploring the dynamics between “[s]uspicious activity
reporting” and “the gatekeeper-client relationship”).
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diminishing clients’ willingness to seek it, and reducing the
economies of expertise that can arise where corporations turn to
outside advisors. For their part, regulators might lack the
competence necessary to piece together information fragments
from multiple gatekeepers that point to wrongdoing, thus failing
to correct for the presence of multiple gatekeeper on major
transactions. Regulators might even fail to pursue wrongdoing
clearly identified by a single gatekeeper, simply lacking the
capacity to sift through the avalanche of new reports they receive.
Collaborative Gatekeepers thoroughly and methodically
assesses many of these objections, as well as others, to the
proposal, explaining why the proposal nevertheless holds
promise. Although, inevitably, I have different views on some
issues than Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels, I find their
arguments eminently reasonable. Indeed, what lends particular
force to their arguments is their carefully documented case study
of an analogous strategy operating in AML regulation. They show
how that analogous strategy “was implemented with some
success” and “grew[] stronger . . . in recent years”37 and how
many of the risks that face their own proposal did not materialize
under that strategy. There is good reason to think that the
proposal would avoid many of the central problems afflicting
gatekeeper liability.
B. How the Proposal Interacts with Conventional Gatekeeper
Liability
1. Distinctive Features of the Proposal
To fully assess the proposal, however, we must understand
how it operates in combination with conventional gatekeeper
liability regimes. Recall that the proposed strategy is overlaid on
existing regulation, including conventional gatekeeper liability
regimes. Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels are clear that their
strategy would not amend or replace existing gatekeeper liability
provisions. For instance, core anti-fraud provisions in federal
securities laws—including Section 11 of the Securities Act38 and
37.
38.

Id. at 893.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012).
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Rule 10b-539 promulgated under Section 10 of the Securities
Exchange Act40—would continue to apply.41 The proposal would
“simply add[] a reporting obligation” to these and other existing
liability rules.42
What the proposal adds is a relatively narrowly tailored
obligation. It requires gatekeepers to report when they suspect
wrongdoing by their clients, not to take additional action that
might disrupt or otherwise deter such wrongdoing. The proposal
thus requires a particular form of gatekeeping intervention—
reporting to a designated regulator. The duty might require some
probing by a gatekeeper of its client’s activities, but that would be
to allow the gatekeeper to determine whether the client’s conduct
in fact “raise[d] suspicions” within the scope of the duty.43 The
duty would not require the gatekeeper to go further, such as to
confirm or dispel its suspicions or even to take corrective action,
but instead would be discharged when the gatekeeper reported its
suspicions.44
Conventional gatekeeper liability regimes, by contrast,
typically require gatekeepers to take action beyond the reporting
of suspicions to regulators. These actions, or precautions,
represent the mechanisms through which gatekeepers exercise
their influence over their clients. Generally speaking, such
precautions include activities that affect the probability of their
clients’ actually engaging in wrongdoing. In business
transactions, precautions include measures to detect and prevent
wrongdoing, such as conducting due diligence, discussing a
client’s activities with its individual managers, and reviewing
39. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
41. See Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 9, at 841 (suggesting that Rule
10b-5 would continue to apply under the new regime).
42. Id. at 913; see also id. at 910 (“[I]f [gatekeepers] choose not to report
promptly, then they will be subject to sanctions for failing to report, on top of
any other violations they might be committing.”).
43. Id. at 837 (“Gatekeepers should evaluate this information and, if
necessary,
make
additional
inquiries
to
supplement
their
intelligence. . . . Through this process, gatekeepers could assess whether their
clients’ conduct raises suspicions.”).
44. In fact, gatekeepers must file reports “even when they do not believe
that their client is actually violating any laws”—provided they nevertheless
suspect misconduct by the client. Id. at 844.
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and revising disclosure documents intended for investors.45 In
some cases, precautions would include “closing the gate” to a
transaction, such as refusing to provide a written opinion on
which completion of a deal is conditioned.46
Accordingly, the proposed strategy is more narrowly
circumscribed than conventional gatekeeper liability. Its
requirements would be satisfied by gatekeepers submitting
reports to regulators rather than by taking other precautions to
deter wrongdoing by clients. By design, the strategy would be
completed early in the transactional process,47 before many of the
precautions contemplated by conventional gatekeeper liability
regimes could occur. It would require gatekeepers to report their
suspicions, empowering regulators to take corrective action
rather than requiring gatekeepers themselves to take such
action.
2. Interpreting Immunity under the Proposal
How would this proposal interact with conventional
gatekeeper liability regimes? They are intertwined in a critical
respect. Under the proposal, gatekeepers that discharge their
reporting duty would gain immunity “from actions arising out of
their reports by regulators and private investors alike, provided
they continue to act in good faith”48—thus potentially immunizing
gatekeepers from liability that they would otherwise face under
existing gatekeeper liability regimes.49

45. For a discussion of due diligence activities, see Andrew F. Tuch,
Conflicted Gatekeepers: The Volcker Rule and Goldman Sachs, 7 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 365, 376–77 (2012).
46. Ronald Gilson observes that a “legal opinion is typically necessary to
complete a placement of securities under the private offering exemption from
registration under the Securities Act of 1933”; by “refusing to provide the
necessary opinion,” a lawyer could exercise his capacity to control his client’s
conduct—and, here, prevent misconduct. Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the
Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 883 (1990).
47. See Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 9, at 838 (“[T]he proposal
encourages gatekeepers to come forward at a much earlier stage.”).
48. Id. at 910.
49. See, e.g., id. at 842 (“T]he immunity attaches to the actions reported,
irrespective of the specific statutes or rules violated [by the gatekeeper].”).
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Consider the possible interpretations of this immunity
through the application of Section 11 of the Securities Act and
Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act to an initial public
offering of securities, perhaps the quintessential gatekeeping
context.50 Consider in this context an underwriter that reported
to the relevant regulator its suspicions about its corporate client’s
public disclosures (in the corporation’s registration statement) of
off-balance sheet activities. Assume that by so reporting the
underwriter discharged its reporting duty under the proposed
regime. Assume also that the suspected wrongdoing eventuated—
the corporation’s registration statement materially misstated its
off-balance sheet activities. Precisely what immunity would this
gatekeeper receive? More specifically, to what extent would the
underwriter be relieved of potential liability under the existing
gatekeeper provisions, in particular Section 11 and Rule 10b-5?
The answer depends on the interpretation given to the
condition that the immunity apply “provided [the gatekeeper]
continue[s] to act in good faith” after satisfying its reporting
duty.51 Of course, we are assuming here that the required
connection existed between the reported conduct and the
eventual wrongdoing to satisfy the immunity’s requirement that
the action “aris[e][] out of [gatekeepers’] reports.”52
In interpreting the proposed immunity, one can imagine a
spectrum of possibilities. At one extreme, the immunity could be
given narrow effect, under which the underwriter would not
easily be relieved of liability under the existing gatekeeper
liability provisions, that is, Section 11 and Rule 10b-5. The
proviso for underwriters to “continue to act in good faith” would
require gatekeepers in fact to discharge their obligations under
these anti-fraud provisions, effectively requiring gatekeepers to,
50. Although they regard their proposal as best suited to transaction types
that are “standardized” or “relatively homogeneous,” and to wrongdoing that
follows “standardized” or “well-trodden paths,” Professor Gadinis and Mr.
Mangels argue for its use even in highly complex transactions. Id. at 894–95.
Indeed, they show how the proposal would apply in settings that diverge widely
in transactional complexity—the execution of trades by broker-dealers and the
auditing of financial statements in securities offerings by accountants.
51. Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 9, at 910. Professor Gadinis and Mr.
Mangels also describe the immunity as applying “for reported actions provided
[gatekeepers] submitted reports in good faith.” Id. at 841.
52. Id. at 910 (emphasis added).

THE LIMITS OF GATEKEEPER LIABILITY

631

for argument’s sake, continue with due diligence after reporting
their suspicions to either dispel or confirm their suspicions and
then to take additional precautions, including having the client
revise its disclosures of off-balance sheet activities.
Though this interpretation would ensure that gatekeepers
continued taking precautions to deter the suspected wrongdoing
even after having reported their suspicions, it would effectively
require the underwriter in the hypothetical scenario to act as it
would have acted under the conventional regime, except for the
additional requirement that it would have to report its initial
suspicions under the newly imposed overlay. So interpreted, the
proposal would represent an additional cost to the underwriter,
rather than potentially offering it relief from its existing
obligations through the immunity.
Such a narrow interpretation could even heighten the
underwriter’s liability risks under the existing provisions.53 This
possibility arises because of the importance under existing
gatekeeper liability provisions of gatekeepers performing due
diligence.54 Under Section 11, gatekeepers can avoid liability
where they make out a so-called due diligence defense. Section 11
subjects underwriters to strict liability for misstatements or
omissions anywhere in a registration statement (other than in
so-called expertised portions),55 unless they can establish a due
diligence defense, which they can do by proving that “after
reasonable investigation, [they had] reasonable ground to believe
and did believe . . . that the statements therein were [not false or
53. Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels suggest this possibility in general
terms:
[I]magine that you are advising a gatekeeper who has just come
across indications of client misconduct. A comprehensive report of
these indications immediately creates a record of the extent of
gatekeeper suspicions at the time. If it turns out that the client is
indeed committing fraud, victims will ask the court to evaluate this
record ex post. Clearly, there is a risk that the court will . . . hold that
the record meets the fault standard for gatekeeper liability . . . .
Id. at 842.
54. This description of the liability framework is largely drawn from Tuch,
supra note 7, at 1636–45.
55. These are parts of the registration statement purported to be
authorized by an expert, such as an accountant, lawyer or other
non-underwriter professional.
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misleading].”56 Underwriters can also face liability in connection
with expertised portions of registration statements, but here they
benefit from a more generous defense than the due diligence
defense. Known as the reliance defense, it omits any requirement
for a “reasonable investigation”; it protects underwriters from
liability where they prove they lacked a belief or reason to believe
that the relevant statements were untrue or that there was a
material omission.57 The due diligence defense is also relevant
under Rule 10b-5, the broadest anti-fraud rule in the securities
regulatory arsenal, because it tends to negate the existence of
scienter58 and thus liability.
In determining whether the due diligence defense has been
established, courts have paid attention to the concept of “red
flags” or “storm warnings.”59 These have been variously defined
as “facts which come to a defendant’s attention that would place a
reasonable party in [the] defendant’s position ‘on notice that the
[issuer] was engaged in wrongdoing to the detriment of its
investors,’”60 and as any information that “strips a defendant of
his confidence” in the accuracy and completeness of statements in
relevant portions of a registration statement.61 Under Section 11,
the existence of red flags may deprive a gatekeeper of the benefit
of either the due diligence defense or the reliance defense under
Section 11. For the due diligence defense, red flags will require
56. Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(A) (2012).
57. 15 U.S.C § 77k(b)(3)(C). Experts—that is, non-underwriter
professionals such as auditors and lawyers—also face liability for misstatements
or omissions in expertised portions of registration statements, but benefit from a
due diligence defense.
58. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., A Statutory and Case Law Primer on Due
Diligence Under the Federal Securities Law, in CONDUCTING DUE DILIGENCE 11,
13 (1995). For example, in In re Software Toolworks Inc. v. Dannenberg, 50 F.3d
615, 626–27 (9th Cir. 1994), the court explained as follows: “Because we
conclude that the Underwriters acted with due diligence in investigating [the
company’s business and revenues], we also hold that the Underwriters did not
act with scienter [under § 10(b)] regarding those claims.”
59. See Tuch, supra note 7, at 1639 (“Red flags, or ‘storm
warnings’ . . . . may be sufficient to deprive a gatekeeper of the benefit of either
the due diligence or reliance defense.”).
60. In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 672 (S.D.N.Y.
2004) (quoting In re Sunterra Corp. Sec. Litig., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1333 (M.D.
Fla. 2002)).
61. Id. at 673.
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the gatekeeper to “look deeper and question more” in order to be
considered to have conducted a “reasonable investigation.”62 For
the reliance defense, red flags will give the underwriter “reason
to believe” an inaccuracy exists in the registration statement.63
The risk for the underwriter under the proposed regime is
that by reporting its suspicions early in a transaction, as
required, it will be taken to have signaled the existence of “red
flags” that are relevant in determining the reasonableness of its
investigations—and thus whether it exercised due diligence—
under Section 11 and Rule 10b-5. If, as seems possible, its
suspicions constituted “red flags,” the underwriter might well
need to then probe further than it would otherwise, seeking to
confirm or dispel its suspicions, in order to avoid liability under
these existing gatekeeper liability provisions—potentially
exposing the underwriter to greater liability risk than it might
have faced in the absence of the newly proposed reporting regime.
This narrow interpretation of the proposal’s immunity thus
complicates the proposed strategy’s appeal. Under this
interpretation, the reporting duty could add to gatekeepers’
burdens in two ways: first, by exposing them to liability for
failing to report suspicious activity by their clients; and second,
by increasing their expected liability under existing gatekeeper
liability rules. In response, gatekeepers might be wary of lodging
reports—and even more inclined to avoid knowledge of facts that
might raise their suspicions than they would be otherwise.
Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels describe the immunity as
providing gatekeepers with an “important incentive” to report64
and suggest that it could “allow [gatekeepers] to report all
relevant facts and avoid unwanted legal and regulatory
adventures”65—suggesting they intended a broader operation for
the immunity.
62. Id. at 677 (quoting In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig.,
235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 707 (S.D. Tex. 2002)). This is not to say that an
underwriter’s precautions will necessarily satisfy the due diligence defense in
the absence of red flags. Determining whether the due diligence defense is
satisfied requires more than “a determination of whether any red flags existed
that would put [the underwriters] on notice of a duty to make an inquiry of [the
non-expertised portion of the registration statement in question].” Id. at 683.
63. Id. at 681.
64. See Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 9, at 841.
65. Id. at 842.
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Consider then moving toward the opposite end of the
interpretive spectrum and giving the immunity an expansive
interpretation. Under such an interpretation, the underwriter
that discharged its reporting obligation would in most cases be
relieved of liability under existing rules, including Section 11 and
Rule 10b-5—assuming, again, that the eventual client
wrongdoing was connected with the gatekeeper’s reported
suspicions (such that the wrongdoing “ar[o]se out of the
[gatekeeper’s] report”). Applying recent corporate law authorities,
the gatekeeper would fail to act in good faith (or, equivalently,66
act in bad faith) and therefore fall afoul of the immunity’s proviso
if it “intentionally fail[ed] to act in the face of a known duty to
act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for [its] duties.”67 Except
in the (presumably) unusual case where bad faith was shown to
exist—such as where the gatekeeper made no attempt at due
diligence post-reporting—the gatekeeper that complied with its
reporting duty would face no liability under conventional
gatekeeper liability regimes.
Such an interpretation would give the immunity far-reaching
effect. It would provide gatekeepers with powerful incentives to
report their suspicions and, therefore, provide regulators with
much new and potentially useful information. Of course, on the
other hand, such an interpretation could seriously undermine the
force of existing gatekeeper liability provisions. If gatekeepers
were largely protected from liability under conventional
gatekeeper provisions for their post-reporting conduct once they
discharged their reporting duty, they would have weaker liability
incentives to take post-reporting precautions to deter client
wrongdoing, although they would still have reputational
incentives to take these precautions.
This interpretation also complicates the proposed strategy’s
appeal. As explained above,68 under conventional regimes,
66. While these concepts (bad faith and the failure to act in good faith) are
not self-evidently equivalent, courts have treated them as generally equivalent.
See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 n.111 (Del. 2006);
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (equating the concepts in analysis).
67. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369 (noting that, in these circumstances, a corporate
director may be found to have breached his or her fiduciary duty of loyalty by
failing to act in good faith). Other conduct regarded as bad faith includes
conduct intended to violate applicable positive law. Id.
68. Supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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gatekeepers have incentives to take a range of precautions—
considerably broader than those contemplated by the proposal—
to deter client wrongdoing. A broad immunity may diminish the
likelihood that gatekeepers will take precautions other than
reporting their suspicions. For instance, it may diminish the
likelihood that the hypothetical underwriter will either confirm
or dispel any suspicions it has about its client and, ultimately,
“close the gate” on the proposed IPO, such as by refusing to sign
the underwriting agreement. It may also heighten risks
associated with regulator incompetence or incapacity because it
shifts the burdens of disrupting corporate wrongdoing onto
regulators once gatekeepers have reported their suspicions and
further requires regulators to determine whether gatekeepers
have acted in good faith and thus come within the terms of the
immunity. The precise scope of the immunity is thus critical to
how the proposal would affect gatekeepers’ incentives.
C. The Calibration of Gatekeeper Liability
There are other complexities involved in assessing whether
the proposal is justified, or desirable. As is well known,
gatekeeper liability exists as part of a larger legal liability
framework. In this framework, the relevant acts making up the
wrongdoing are performed by the corporation or, more accurately,
by an individual or individuals who act for or on behalf of the
corporation. To (directly) deter that wrongdoing, liability can be
imposed on the corporate enterprise, as well as on the
corporation’s managers. Such liability creates incentives for the
corporation and its managers to take precautions by exercising
their control over the individual perpetrators. (Obviously, the
individual perpetrators can face liability as well.)
Gatekeeper liability supplements these more direct forms of
liability for controlling corporate wrongdoing.69 In the commonly
adopted paradigm, initially employed by Professor Reinier
Kraakman in his pioneering work and now routinely used,
gatekeeper liability regimes aspire to optimally deter
wrongdoing, that is, to “yield the ‘right’ amount of compliance
69.

See supra note 3.
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with legal rules—bearing in mind that enforcing these duties is
itself costly.”70 Thus, gatekeeper liability regimes find
justification when both enterprise and individual liability “fail to
elicit sufficient compliance at an acceptable cost.”71
Still more must be shown to justify imposing liability on
gatekeepers for the wrongdoing of their clients. Gatekeepers
must have the capacity to monitor and to control, or at least to
influence, the conduct of their clients and thereby to deter
wrongdoing by them.72 Because gatekeepers’ reputations may
provide powerful incentives for them to disrupt wrongdoing, even
in the absence of gatekeeper liability, these forces must—in
combination with more direct forms of liability—fail to “yield the
‘right’ amount of compliance with legal rules,”73 such that further
incentives for gatekeepers to oppose wrongdoing would be
desirable. Gatekeepers’ reputations must also be substantial
enough that they can be “staked” by gatekeepers on the accuracy
and completeness of their clients’ assertions.74 Making the case
for gatekeeper liability—and justifying extensions to it—is thus
fraught with complexity.
This complexity of a conventional gatekeeper liability regime
arises from the interdependencies between gatekeeper liability
and both direct liability mechanisms and market-based
incentives.75 Gatekeeper liability serves to supplement these
other forces for deterring wrongdoing, and is justified only where,
together with them, it deters corporate wrongdoing more cost
effectively than alternative regimes.76 As Reinier Kraakman has
explained, “the task is to pick the optimal joint strategy.”77 In
theory, it is thus not enough for gatekeeper liability to deter
70. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 1, at 857–58.
Professor Kraakman cites as authority for this statement Gary S. Becker, Crime
and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL’Y ECON. 169 (1968) and
Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 289 (1983).
71. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 1, at 888–89.
72. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text (emphasizing this
requirement for liability).
73. Supra note 70.
74. Supra note 5.
75. Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 1, at 55.
76. See id. at 88.
77. Id. at 87–88 (emphasis added).
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greater harm than the costs it imposes; rather, because
gatekeeper liability regimes are inseparable from direct liability
rules and market-generated incentives, gatekeeper liability will
only be justified when it and the deterrent measures that it
supplements produce benefits (reduced wrongdoing) that cannot
“be purchased more cheaply.”78
Though the proposed strategy may well avoid many of the
shortcomings of conventional gatekeeper liability regimes, its
desirability seems likely to hinge on an especially complex
calculus. Would the proposal’s benefits—its additional deterrent
force—more than offset its costs? Answering this question will
require a precise articulation of the scope of the proposal’s
immunity. Even if the proposal’s cost-benefit comparison is
favorable, the harder question is why policymakers should resort
to the proposed regime to bolster the existing deterrence of
corporate wrongdoing, rather than to alternative measures such
as tightening up existing liability regimes by increasing sanctions
on corporate wrongdoers or on the individual perpetrators acting
on their behalf. In examining these questions, policymakers
would need to predict gatekeepers’ likely response to the proposed
regime; would they, for example, adopt contractual risk-shifting
devices to shift the incidence of liability—such as requiring their
clients to indemnify them for liability under the regime?79 How
would clients respond? Because they control the selection and
involvement of gatekeepers, might clients simply distance
gatekeepers from their business dealings or decide to “make”
rather than “buy” gatekeeping services by bringing gatekeepers
within the boundaries of the firm? How effective will regulators
be in disrupting wrongdoing that gatekeepers suspected and
reported? Policymakers would also need to consider, in addition
78. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 1, at 866; see also
Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 1, at 87–88 (“Gatekeeping might yield
enforcement benefits and still be a poor strategy if, for example, additional
penalties directed against wrongdoers could avert the same harm more
cheaply.”).
79. Gatekeepers face incentives to adopt risk-shifting measures. See
Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 1, at 859–62 (noting that
gatekeepers can avoid liability by shifting risks). In securities transactions they
routinely adopt such measures. See Tuch, supra note 7, at 1646 (“In response to
potential liability under Section 11, underwriters routinely adopt risk-shifting
arrangements with other gatekeepers, namely accountants and lawyers.”).
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to the proposal’s basic costs—e.g., the costs of enforcement (public
and private) and the costs of compliance for law-abiding
corporations80—the proposal’s effects on existing liability regimes,
including, for example, whether they may reduce the deterrent
force of existing regimes (as they would seem to do under a broad
interpretation of the immunity).
As now-Justice Stephen Breyer has observed, “to know that
change [to an industry or regulation] is truly desirable and
practical[,] the problem must be investigated further—
empirically and in depth.”81 New studies will often be required,
because existing studies often lack adequate information.82 The
complex analysis required to justify imposing gatekeeper liability
invites scientific precision, and yet will inevitably rest on
judgments that will be political and contested. The analysis will
be complicated by the interactions between the proposal and
conventional gatekeeper liability regimes. The apparent success
of a similar reporting-based regime in AML regulation provides
some comfort, although one may question how generalizable that
experience is to other financial settings.83 The proposal will prove
difficult to justify—not because it lacks justification, but because
gatekeeper liability, by its nature, hinges on the satisfaction of
numerous complex conditions that may not be easily established.
Nevertheless, while it is not clear how the assessment of the
proposal would come out in the settings in which the proposal
could apply, there is more than enough in Collaborative
Gatekeepers to regard this novel proposed strategy as not only
feasible but deserving further serious inquiry.

80. See Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies, supra note 1, at 878
(discussing the costs of liability regimes).
81. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 318 (1982).
82. Gadinis & Mangels, supra note 9, at 318–19.
83. Professor Gadinis and Mr. Mangels regard their proposal as best suited
to transaction types that are “standardized” or “relatively homogeneous,” and to
wrongdoing that follows “standardized” or “well-trodden paths,” but also argue
for its use even in highly complex transactions, including those that may differ
significantly from transactions subject to AML regulation. Id. at 894–95.
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IV. A Possible Extension
I conclude by briefly suggesting an extension to the
Gadinis-Mangels strategy to address one of the dangers of the
multiple gatekeeper phenomenon.84 The concern here is not that
multiple information fragments need to be pieced together (a
concern the proposal addresses), but that suspicions will not
arise—to trigger the reporting requirement—unless information
is first pooled or expertise first combined. This concern arises
from the specialization of gatekeepers and the possibility that
suspecting wrongdoing that is underway may require the
combined specialized skills of multiple gatekeepers. This concern
would be greatest with complex, low-visibility wrongs. It is
possible that no single gatekeeper (acting unilaterally) would
possess the knowledge or expertise required to suspect
wrongdoing that is afoot in circumstances where multiple
cooperating gatekeepers would indeed suspect such wrongdoing.
I briefly propose a possible solution to this problem as food
for thought. It involves imposing the proposed reporting duty not
on all gatekeepers, but on a single gatekeeper—the anointed
“best briber.”85 In a securities transaction, especially with regard
to defects in non-expertised portions of the registration
statement, this could be the underwriter. Putting liability on the
underwriter alone to report suspicions and holding it responsible
for reporting wrongdoing that could have been suspected by
multiple gatekeepers would provide powerful incentives for the
underwriter to ensure it possesses the expertise required (such as
by employing lawyers and auditors), thus acting much like a
multi-disciplinary gatekeeper. To the extent it does not (or
cannot) do this, it could rely on other gatekeepers—as it typically
does in a securities transaction. What it normally does is employ
risk-shifting devices—such as so-called “comfort” or “negative
assurance” letters—designed to ensure that the gatekeepers on
which it relies are liable to it to the extent it faces liability for
wrongdoing.86 But for this regime to work, the underwriter would
84. Supra note 7 and accompanying text.
85. This is likely to be the actor that can most cheaply coordinate with
other gatekeepers in order to reduce the costs of wrongdoing. GUIDO CALABRESI,
THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 150 (1970).
86. For a description of these risk-shifting devices among gatekeepers on
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need to face liability not only for its conduct, but also for the
conduct of the gatekeepers on which it relied. Then it would have
incentives to ensure that those other gatekeepers passed on
relevant information or used the right expertise—so effectively
that, though distinct, they operated as a single multi-disciplinary
gatekeeper, thus overcoming the defects associated with the
fragmentation of the gatekeeping net. This preliminary proposal
addresses potentially troubling products of the multiple
gatekeeper phenomenon—the opportunity it creates for clients to
disaggregate their work among multiple gatekeepers for the
purpose of minimizing the ability of any individual gatekeeper to
deter or suspect wrongdoing and, for that matter, for gatekeepers
themselves to narrow their scope of services or alleged expertise
to avoid responsibility for wrongdoing that, with a broader focus
or help from other gatekeepers, they might have suspected. This
suggestion is premised on the idea that gatekeepers are in the
best position to apportion liability among themselves.
V. Conclusion
Conventional gatekeeper liability regimes face formidable
challenges. They are hard to justify and to design. Professor
Gadinis and Mr. Mangels’s ambitious proposal deftly navigates
this terrain. Their proposal is rooted in precedent and yet novel
in application. Whether it is justified in particular settings must
be left for future work to determine, but there is more than
enough promise in the proposal to warrant scholars and
policymakers pursuing the research agenda that Collaborative
Gatekeepers has laid out.

securities transactions, see Tuch, supra note 7, at 1645–48.

